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reader gains a nuanced mental picture
of the moving parts on both sides of
the conflict. Scholars and researchers
who desire in-depth information will
benefit from Giangreco’s research,
and the appendices and bibliography
include numerous primary sources that
have received little or no attention in
past traditionalist-versus-revisionist
debates. This work is a must-read for
those interested in U.S. and Japanese
military and political historiography and
strategy in the final year of World War
II and the critical factors contributing
to war termination in the Pacific.
GINA GRANADOS PALMER

Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy,
American Empire, and the Transformation of
U.S. Naval Identity, 1873–1898, by Scott Mobley.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018. 432
pages. $34.95.

Judging Scott Mobley’s Progressives in
Navy Blue by its cover, it might seem
a bit esoteric. The parallels with the
modern U.S. Navy, however, quickly
become apparent in this well-written
and -researched history of the transition
of our Navy from sail to steam and from
constabulary force to national fleet. This
is Mobley’s first book, but in a thirtyyear career as a nuclear-trained surface
warfare officer, including command of
two ships, he lived the same “warriorengineer” dichotomy that was central to
the late-nineteenth-century American
naval culture around which this book
revolves. The U.S. Navy between the
Civil and Spanish-American Wars
engenders limited historical discourse
owing to the lack of naval combat, but
Mobley asserts that the progressive
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currents that the naval officer corps
debated during this period marked a
pivotal shift in ideas on naval professionalism and strategic thinking.
The Gilded Age Navy, in relation to
its time, was not an anachronistic
organization wedded to outdated ideas,
as it often is portrayed. Indeed, in many
ways, the Navy of the 1870s and 1880s
preceded the national Progressive
movement. Even as the Navy addressed
the massive challenges involved in
incorporating emerging technology
into an organization steeped in tradition, the service simultaneously had
to deal with the emergence of national
strategic thought. The idea that America
should maintain a navy for war during
peacetime ran counter to a century
of tradition. Mobley asserts that this
change in strategic focus drove the
cultural shift in the Navy officer corps.
In this he challenges previous scholars
“who attribute the Navy’s revival to
a mix of commercial expansionism,
hegemonic aspirations, and imperial ambition” (p. 12). Progressives in Navy Blue
adds to the scholarship by considering
the “influence of strategic ideas, beliefs,
values, and practices upon the Navy’s
professional culture and identity” (p. 14).
With the marked exception of the Civil
War, within the service’s first century
“decades of overseas service, policing,
and promoting America’s maritime
empire fundamentally shaped the U.S.
Navy as a constabulary force led by
mariner-warriors” (p. 37). The post–
Civil War American navy emphasized
single-ship operations, with limited to
no opportunity for multiship training.
Naval officers and civilian leaders
saw no need to dedicate resources to
homeland defense, believing that the
frigate-and-coastal-fort system in place
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since the Navy’s inception still sufficed.
But by 1880 the focus had shifted
from imperial constabulary duties
to national defense as “the essential
foundation of naval policy” (p. 143).
While most historians tie the renaissance of the U.S. Navy to the nation’s
imperialist expansion around the
turn of the twentieth century, Mobley
asserts that the birth of the modern
American navy predated this imperialist
surge—perhaps even facilitating it.
Navy progressives were divided in
their approach to advancing the Navy.
One branch focused on harnessing
technology, while the other advocated
the study of strategy. As an ardent voice
for technology, Lieutenant Bradley A.
Fiske advocated for developing ships
with the latest technology, to stand up
to the more advanced European navies.
At the opposite end of the progressive
movement, Rear Admiral Stephen B.
Luce founded the Naval War College
in 1884 to ensure that the officer corps
studied not only emerging technology
but also the art and science of war. These
two branches of progressivism “clashed
between 1887 and 1897 in a series of
bureaucratic and cultural struggles, with
the Naval War College their primary
battleground” (p. 207). Despite their
differences, however, “the two cultures
complemented each other in many
ways. . . . Indeed, many officers readily
embraced both perspectives” (p. 207).
Using Harold L. Wilensky’s professionalization model, Mobley tracks how
the U.S. naval officer corps established
its professional credentials. The final
step involved the establishment of
the U.S. Naval Institute and the Naval
War College as forums for debating
ideas. Prior to the 1873 founding of
the Naval Institute, no forum existed
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for professional discussion within the
naval service. The institute was open to
all officers; the founders hoped that the
inclusion of many voices would advance
the profession as a whole. Mobley
claims that—contrary to historiography
regarding this era holding that naval
education existed only at the intellectual fringes—“the early Naval War
College mirrored the progressive trends
shaping new graduate schools and social
science disciplines in the United States
during the Gilded Age” (pp. 182–83).
Many of the lessons Mobley identifies
can inform today’s warrior-engineer
debate. As the information age matures
and the robotics age emerges, America’s
navy faces new technological and strategic challenges. Those who trust technology to dominate future warfare and
those who argue for the continued need
to study the science of war continue to
clash, just as they did over a century ago.
Lieutenant William Bainbridge-Hoff ’s
observation rings as validly today as
when he uttered it in 1886: “[W]ellconstructed strategy must consider
technology, just as technology should be
informed by strategy” (p. 207). For this
reason, those desiring to advance the
naval profession should read this book.
JAMES P. MCGRATH III

Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking
American Seapower and What to Do about It, by
Seth Cropsey. New York: Encounter Books, 2017.
408 pages. $27.99.

In Seablindness, Seth Cropsey delivers a
comprehensive examination of sea power and makes a compelling argument for
the modernization and recapitalization
of the U.S. Navy. To do so he analyzes
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